



THE PUBLIC LAWYER

NOVEMBER 8, 2004



NEVADA CASES

<http://www.leg.state.nv.us/scd/OpinionListPage.cfm>


Maiola v. State, 120 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 76 (October 26, 2004). “We previously issued an opinion in this matter on January 15, 2004. After respondent petitioned for rehearing, we withdrew that opinion while we considered the petition for rehearing. We now grant the petition for rehearing and issue this opinion in place of our prior opinion. On rehearing, we reach the same conclusion as in our prior opinion but for different reasons.

The principal issue in this appeal is whether the district court in which a criminal proceeding was heard has jurisdiction to hear a motion for return of property relating to that criminal proceeding under NRS 179.085 after there has been a default judgment in a civil forfeiture proceeding. We conclude that it does.”

Vest v. State, 120 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 75 (October 14, 2004). “In Layton, this court held that ‘[t]he district court has no authority to grant a new trial once the notice of appeal has been filed.’ At the time Layton was decided in 1973, NRS 176.515(3) provided: ‘A motion for a new trial based on the ground of newly discovered evidence may be made only before or within two years after final judgment, *but if an appeal is pending the court may grant the motion only on remand of the case.*’ (Emphasis added.)

However, in 1983, NRS 176.515(3) was amended and the emphasized language was removed. The statute now provides that ‘[a] motion for a new trial based on the ground of newly discovered evidence may be made only within 2 years after the verdict or finding of guilt.’ Based on the plain language of the statute as it presently reads, we conclude that it is no longer necessary for this court to remand an appeal in order for the district court to grant a post-judgment motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.”

Middleton v. Warden, 120 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 74 (October 14, 2004). “This is an appeal from a district court order denying a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. For the



reasons stated below, we remove attorney Robert Bruce Lindsay as appellant David Middleton's post-conviction counsel, vacate the district court order denying Middleton's habeas corpus petition, and remand this appeal with instructions to appoint new counsel to represent Middleton and reinitiate post-conviction proceedings in the district court.

The opening brief submitted by Lindsay was disorganized and often incoherent. Throughout the brief were multiple pages of single-spaced citation to case law with little or no factual analysis or support. Compounding these deficiencies were improper legal citations, typographical errors, and arguments with no discernable beginning or end.

Most notable, however, was Lindsay's response to this court's January 21, 2004, order. Despite this court's explicit directives, Lindsay maintained his incorrect reading of *Haberstroh* and failed to include a complete and relevant statement of facts in his opening brief. And no supporting citations to the multiple appendices were provided. To comply with the 80-page limit, Lindsay made no effort to amend the opening brief and chose instead to tear out the final eight pages, abruptly ending the discussion of one issue and completely omitting any discussion of four other issues listed in the brief's table of contents.”

Durango Fire Protection, Inc. v. Troncoso, 120 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 73 (October 14, 2004). *Durango Fire Protection, Inc.*, appeals from a district court order denying its motion to set aside a judgment arising out of a breach of contract action filed by Fernando Troncoso. After no one had appeared on Durango's behalf at several hearings and calendar calls, the district court granted Troncoso's oral motion to strike Durango's answer and entered judgment in favor of

Troncoso. On appeal, Durango contends that (1) because Durango did not receive notice prior to judgment being entered in Troncoso's favor, as assertedly required by NRCP 55, the judgment is void; (2) neglect of Durango's counsel is reason for relief from judgment under NRCP 60(b); and (3) several procedural errors warrant relief from judgment. Because we conclude that Durango's grounds for relief from judgment lack merit, we affirm.”

The Doctors Company v. Vincent, 120 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 72 (October 13, 2004). “In this appeal, we consider the procedures for perfecting, as part of a settlement, claims for contribution among joint tortfeasors and implied indemnity. As discussed below, these remedies allow persons extinguishing their individual tort liabilities to seek reimbursement in part or in full from other responsible parties.

The resolution of this appeal centers in large part upon several related statutory principles. First, a joint tortfeasor seeking to perfect a contribution claim in the context of a settlement must first extinguish the liabilities of the other joint tortfeasors against whom contribution recovery is sought. Second, a tortfeasor seeking to perfect an implied indemnity claim in the context of a settlement is not required to extinguish the liabilities of joint tortfeasors against whom indemnity recovery is sought. Third, any joint tortfeasor in a multi-defendant tort action may obtain protection from claims of contribution and implied indemnity by settling with the tort claimant in good faith under NRS 17.245. Fourth, the district court's discretion in determining the good or bad faith of a particular settlement is not talismanic, but rather, must be exercised based upon a myriad of considerations.”

Atkinson v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 120 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 71 (October 13, 2004). “On appeal from the district court's final judgment, Cherie Atkinson challenges the district court's



denial of her proffered jury instruction based on a Nevada statute that governs the erection of fences around holes, excavations and shafts. We hold that the district court incorrectly denied Atkinson's jury instruction and that the jury instruction should have been given. We reverse the district court's judgment and remand the case for a new trial."

"Hire Vets First" Campaign Launches October 1

The President's National Hire Veterans Committee is pleased to announce that the www.HireVetsFirst.gov Web site is now available. The Web site provides information on the Hire Vets First initiative and directs businesses interested in hiring veterans to America's Service Locator (http://www.servicelocator.org/nearest_onestop.asp) or to 1-877-US2-JOBS to find their closest One-Stop Career Center for services. The Web site also refers veterans interested in employment opportunities to their nearest One-Stop Career Center via the same methods.

Labor Department Posts Draft Regulations for Law that Safeguards Guard and Reserve Members' Jobs and Benefits

DOL announced that it has published draft regulations in the Federal Register that interpret the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Act of 1994 (USERRA). Congress passed USERRA to safeguard the employment rights and benefits of service members upon their return to civilian life.

- Read the [news release](#).
- Read the [proposed regulations](#).

HSA Frequently Asked Questions

<http://www.treas.gov/offices/public-affairs/hsa/>

What is a Health Savings Account ("HSA")?

A Health Savings Account allows individuals to pay for current health expenses and save for future qualified medical and retiree health expenses on a tax free basis.

How can I get a Health Savings Account?

Consumers can sign up for HSAs with providers which will generally be insurance companies and banks. Employers are likely to set up plans for employees as well in which case the employer will generally be arranging the HSA for the employee.

Who is eligible for a Health Savings Account?

To be eligible for a Health Savings Account, an individual must be covered by a High Deductible Health Plan (HDHP), must not be covered by other health insurance (does not apply to specific injury insurance and accident, disability, dental care, vision care, long-term care), is not eligible for Medicare, and can't be claimed as a dependent on someone else's tax return.

What Is a High Deductible Health Plan (HDHP)?

A HDHP is a health insurance plan with minimum deductible of \$1,000 (self-only coverage) or \$2,000 (family coverage). The annual out-of-pocket (including deductibles and co-pays) cannot exceed \$5,000 (self-only coverage) or \$10,000 (family coverage). HDHPs can have first dollar coverage (no deductible) for preventive care and higher out-of-pocket (copays & coinsurance) for non-network services.

Who can contribute to a Health Savings Account?



Contributions to HSAs can be made by either the employer or the individual, or both. If contributions are made by the individual, it is an "above-the-line" deduction. If contributions are made by the employer, it is not taxable to the employee (excluded from income). Contributions can also be made by others on behalf of an eligible individual and deducted by the individual. All contributions are aggregated.

How much can I contribute to a Health Savings Account?

The maximum contribution is the lesser of the deductible amount under the HDHP or (for 2004) \$2,600 for individuals or \$5,150 for family coverage. These dollar limits will be adjusted for inflation each year.

Do Health Savings Account funds roll over year after year and get invested?

Yes, the money invested in a Health Savings Account rolls over year after year.

Who has control over the money invested in a Health Savings Account?

In most cases the individual will have control over the assets. However, we know that some employers are exploring the idea of having control over the investments.

What happens to the money in a Health Savings Account after you hit age 65?

Once you hit 65, the amounts can be used for health expenses and to pay certain insurance premiums like Medicare Part A & B, Medicare HMO and the employee's share of retiree medical insurance premiums. It cannot be used to purchase a Medigap policy. It can also be used for any other expenses. If used for medical expenses, the amounts come out of the

account tax free. If used for other expenses, the amount received will be taxable.

Can you roll the money in a Health Savings Account over into an IRA?

You cannot roll the HSA funds over into an IRA. They will stay in the HSA or be rolled into another HSA.

What can distributions from the HSA be used for?

The amounts can be distributed for either qualified medical or other expenses. If the amount distributed is used for qualified medical expenses, then the distribution is tax free. If the amount distributed is used for other than qualified medical expenses, the amount distributed will be taxed and, for individuals who are not disabled or over age 65, subject to a 10% tax penalty.

Are dental and vision care qualified medical expenses under a Health Savings Account?


Yes, as long as these are deductible under the current rules. For example, cosmetic procedures, like cosmetic dentistry, are generally not deductible and would not be considered qualified medical expenses.

NINTH CIRCUIT CASES

(Ninth Circuit cases can be found at

<http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/neopinions.nsf>)

United States v. Contreras-Salas, No. 03-10710 (November 3, 2004). "The district court concluded that Contreras-Salas' prior jury conviction in 1987 for 'Child Abuse and/or Neglect Causing Substantial Bodily Harm' under Nevada Revised Statutes § 200.508 was a crime of violence, imposed the 16-level increase to the base offense level and sentenced her to 77 months' imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release.



We review the district court's interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Contreras-Salas argues that Nevada's child abuse statute is overly inclusive and punishes some conduct that does not constitute a 'crime of violence.' She further contends that documents the district court relied on — the charging document, the presentence report and the judgment — were insufficient to establish which aspect of the statute her conviction was based upon. Applying this circuit's 'modified categorical approach,' we hold that Contreras-Salas' conviction does not qualify as a crime of violence and thus reverse the district court's judgment and vacate her sentence."

Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Smith, No. 02-56943 (November 3, 2004). "The Cabazon Band of Mission Indians appeals the district court's order granting summary judgment to the County of Riverside and its Sheriff Larry Smith . Through its suit, the Tribe seeks a determination that vehicles operated by its Public Safety Department are 'authorized emergency vehicles' permitted to use and display emergency light bars while traveling on public roads between the noncontiguous portions of the Tribe's reservation. Before the Tribe's suit, Defendants repeatedly stopped and cited the Tribe's police officers for violating California's Vehicle Code whenever the officers traveled on nonreservation roads to respond to emergency calls from different portions of the reservation. The Tribe argues that prohibiting its emergency vehicles from displaying emergency light bars creates an undue burden on its ability to effectively perform on-reservation law enforcement functions.

Because we conclude that applying the light bar prohibition to the Tribe's police vehicles is discriminatory, we reverse."

United States v. Padilla, Nos. 02-50636 (November 2, 2004). "Nicholas Padilla appeals his jury conviction of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Padilla argues that his motion for new trial should have been granted because, after his conviction, a state court invalidated his predicate state conviction nunc pro tunc. Padilla also challenges the district court's admission of a statement obtained from him allegedly in violation of *Miranda v. Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Finally, Padilla contends that the district court erred in admitting expert testimony relating to gang behavior. We reject all of these contentions and affirm Padilla's conviction."

United States v. Washington, No. 02-10526 (November 2, 2004). "The district court denied Ronald Berry Washington's motion to suppress evidence that Reno Police Department officers obtained during a search of Washington's residential hotel room. Washington appeals. Washington contends that the officers repeatedly violated his Fourth Amendment rights; that his written consent to search his room was coerced; and that, even if not coerced, the consent itself and the evidence obtained pursuant to the consent were tainted by the officers' violations of his Fourth Amendment rights. We agree with Washington that the officers repeatedly violated his Fourth Amendment rights and that both Washington's written consent and the evidence obtained pursuant to it were tainted. Accordingly, as explained in greater detail below, we reverse the district court's denial of Washington's motion to suppress."



***Parle v. Runnels*, No. 02-16896 (November 1, 2004).** “David L. Runnels, Warden of the High Desert State Prison, appeals an order of the district court granting a writ of habeas corpus to Timothy Charles Parle, a prisoner in his custody who was convicted of murder in the first degree. The district court held that the California Court of Appeal unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent regarding the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, and that the cumulative prejudicial effect of errors at trial deprived petitioner of a fair trial in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Petitioner cross-appeals an additional holding: that his constitutional right to testify was not violated.

We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2253. We REVERSE the district court, VACATE its order of relief, and REMAND for further proceedings on petitioner’s cumulative error claim. We hold that the district court did not accord appropriate deference to the state courts when it found their conclusions unreasonable. Regarding petitioner’s cross appeal, we conclude that, even assuming that the arbitrary restrictions placed on petitioner’s testimony effectively denied him his right to testify on his own behalf, any such error did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict.”

***United States v. Mayfield*, No. 02-50381 (October 29, 2004).** “Defendant-appellant Jerry Wayne Mayfield appeals his sentence, imposed following his conviction after a jury trial, for possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742, and we affirm.

In this appeal, Mayfield contends that 21 U.S.C. § 851(a) required the government, after our remand following the first trial and prior to the second trial, to refile the information charging the prior felony drug conviction. As a result of the government’s failure to do so, Mayfield argues, the district court violated his due process rights by applying the enhanced mandatory minimum penalties of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).”

***Gaston v. Palmer*, No. 01-56367 (October 28, 2004).** “Anthony Gaston, a California prisoner, seeks review of the district court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court held that Gaston’s petition was time-barred under the one-year statute of limitations of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Gaston concedes that he filed his petition more than one year after the statutory period began to run, but he makes three arguments why the statute should be tolled. We agree with his third argument, and hold, on the facts of this case, that Gaston is entitled to tolling during the time his state court habeas applications were pending. ‘Pending, in this context, includes the intervals between the dismissal of one state application and the filing of the next one. Because Gaston is allowed tolling for the time his state court applications were pending, his federal habeas petition is timely. We therefore reverse the district court’s dismissal of his petition and remand for further proceedings.”

***Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Center v. Bureau of Land Management*, No. 03-35461 (October 28, 2004).** “The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the BLM. To make an informed decision about how or whether to proceed with the proposed projects and to comply with NEPA, an



agency must identify their potential combined environmental impacts and make that information available to the public. We reverse the judgment of the district court because the analyses performed by the BLM do not sufficiently consider the cumulative impacts posed by the timber sales.”

Kahawaiolaa v. Norton, No. 02-17239 (October 27, 2004). “In this appeal, we consider whether the exclusion of native Hawaiians from the Department of Interior’s regulations acknowledging the federally recognized status of Indian tribes comprises discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection component to the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. We have jurisdiction to determine whether the regulations are unconstitutional, and we conclude that they do not violate the Fifth Amendment under rational basis scrutiny.”

United States v. Fernandez, No. 01-50082 (October 27, 2004). “Appellants Frank Fernandez, Roy Gavaldon, David Gonzales-Contreras, Dominick Gonzales, Jimmy Sanchez, and Suzanne Schoenberg-Sanchez were convicted on a variety of RICO and drug- trafficking charges relating to their participation in or involvement with the Mexican Mafia or ‘the Eme.’ They appeal their convictions on numerous grounds. Four of the Appellants also raise challenges to their sentences. We affirm the convictions of all six defendants; affirm the sentences of Fernandez, Gavaldon and Schoenberg; and remand for re-sentencing in the cases of Contreras, Gonzales, and Sanchez. We will, however, stay the issuance of the mandate as to all appellants except Sanchez pending the Supreme Court’s resolution of the impact of *Blakely v.*

Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), on the federal sentencing guidelines.”

McGary v. City of Portland, No. 02-35668 (October 27, 2004). “Richard McGary brought this action against the City of Portland, alleging that the City discriminated against him on the basis of his disability, in violation of the Fair Housing Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and parallel state and local laws, when it denied his request for additional time to clean his yard in order to comply with the City’s nuisance abatement ordinance. The district court dismissed McGary’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). On appeal, we hold that McGary adequately pled that the City discriminated against him by failing to reasonably accommodate his disability under the relevant statutes. We therefore reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings.”

United States v. Ramirez-Robles, No. 03-30122 (October 21, 2004). “Jose Ramirez-Robles appeals his jury convictions of distribution of methamphetamine and conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, violations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. The charged transaction took place between Ramirez-Robles’s girlfriend, Sheree Turner, and a government informant. At trial Turner testified that she was acting at Ramirez-Robles’s direction. On appeal Ramirez-Robles argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him, that the district court erred by admitting evidence of his prior bad acts, and that the district court erred by excluding polygraph evidence without a *Daubert* hearing. We affirm.”

Cetacean Community v. Bush, No. 03-15866 (October 20, 2004). “We are asked to decide



whether the world's cetaceans have standing to bring suit in their own name under the Endangered Species Act, the Marine Mammal Protection Act, the National Environmental Protection Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act. We hold that cetaceans do not have standing under these statutes.

The sole plaintiff in this case is the Cetacean Community. The Cetacean Community is the name chosen by the Cetaceans' self-appointed attorney for all of the world's whales, porpoises, and dolphins. The Cetaceans challenge the United States Navy's use of Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System Low Frequency Active Sonar during wartime or heightened threat conditions."


Kuba v. 1-A Agricultural Ass'n, No. 02-16989 (October 19, 2004). "Alfredo Kuba demonstrates on behalf of animal rights at the Cow Palace every year, when the circus or the rodeo is playing there. The Palace, a performance facility, located just south of San Francisco, is owned by the State of California and operated by 1-A District Agricultural Association. In 1988, the Board of Directors of the Association adopted a 'First Amendment Expression Policy', which prohibits individuals from demonstrating outside the Palace except in designated 'free expression zones,' none of which is near an entrance to the building. Kuba maintains that these 'free expression zones' do not allow demonstrators access to patrons of the Palace adequate to allow engaging in conversation or handing out leaflets. He challenged the Policy in federal district court, both facially and as applied to him, as violative of the First Amendment, the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the federal constitution, and the free speech, equal

protection, and due process protections of the California Constitution. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court held the Policy a permissible time, place and manner regulation, dismissed Kuba's motion for summary judgment, granted the Association's motion, and dismissed Kuba's complaint with prejudice. Kuba timely appealed. We reverse."

Nader v. Brewer, No. 04-16880 (October 14, 2004). "Ralph Nader and Peter Camejo, independents running for President and Vice-President of the United States in the November 2004 general election, and some of their political supporters appeal the district court's denial of their motion for injunctive relief against Janice Brewer in her official capacity as Secretary of State of Arizona. Appellants allege that Arizona's elections statutes are unconstitutional in certain aspects, and seek to have Nader's and Camejo's names added to Arizona's ballot. Early voting began in Arizona on September 30, 2004.

We need not decide whether the district court was correct on the probability of success on the merits. Regardless of Appellants' probability of success on the merits, Appellants' delay in bringing this action and the balance of hardships in favor of the Appellees were so great that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that the Appellants are not entitled to relief. We therefore affirm the district court's order denying the preliminary injunction. Our disposition will affect the rights of the parties only until the district court renders final judgment."

United States v. Smith, No. 03-30482 (October 15, 2004). "Smith argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction over her prosecution because retaliating against a witness is not a crime listed in the Major



Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153, which extends federal jurisdiction to specific crimes committed by and against Indians in Indian Country. This argument is foreclosed by *United States v. Begay*, 42 F.3d 486 (9th Cir. 1994).

We explained in *Begay* that federal criminal laws of ‘nationwide applicability’ apply to Indians within Indian country just as they apply elsewhere.”

Casey v. Moore, No. 03-35294 (October 12, 2004). “John Henry Casey appeals the district court’s denial of his habeas petition, insisting that a biased jury that was convened for a trial in an improper venue convicted him after considering impermissible hearsay evidence, and after improper closing argument from the prosecutor, all in violation of the United States Constitution. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 2253, and we affirm in part and dismiss in part.”

Qwest Corp. v. City of Portland, No. 02-35473 (October 12, 2004). “Qwest Corporation, a telecommunication provider, appeals the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the City of Portland and other Oregon cities, who intervened in the action. Qwest contends that the Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 (FTA), 47 U.S.C. § 253, preempts the municipal ordinances pursuant to which the franchise fees were assessed. The district court ruled that the Cities’ ordinances and various franchise agreements were not preempted by the FTA. The district court also determined that the revenue-based fees imposed on the telecommunication providers by the Cities were valid under the FTA. Because the district court failed to conduct an individualized § 253 preemption analysis

for each city’s ordinances, and misapplied our holding in *City of Auburn v. Qwest*, 260 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2001), we must remand the case to the district court for additional consideration. Because the district court correctly concluded that Qwest’s challenge to the Cities’ gross revenue-based fees was barred by claim and issue preclusion, that ruling is affirmed.”

United States v. Hayes, No. 02-10203 (October 8, 2004). “In this appeal, H. Wayne Hayes asks us to reverse the judgment of the district court and to order the United States to reimburse him for restitution payments he made subject to a criminal judgment that was later vacated on collateral review. Under the circumstances presented by this case, we conclude that Hayes is not entitled to the relief that he seeks, and we affirm the judgment of the district court.”

Here is a NACO page with a variety of laws on a number of subjects. Go to this page http://www.naco.org/Template.cfm?Section=Find_a_County and then click on codes and ordinances. Select a subject to see a listing of county codes and ordinances we have collected in that subject area.

[Adult Entertainment](#)
[Affirmative Action](#)
[Agricultural Lands](#)
[Animal Wastes](#)
[Animals](#)
[Bank Shares Tax Replacement](#)
[Benchmarks and Indications](#)
[Brownfields Redevelopment](#)
[Building Code](#)
[Campaign Lobbying & Finance](#)
[Communities](#)
[Comprehensive Watershed Planning](#)
[Coroner Elections](#)
[Curfews & Loitering](#)
[Drug & Alcohol Testing](#)
[Education and Outreach](#)



Elected Officials
Environmental Protection
Ethics
Exotic Animals
Firearms
Firearms (Shooting Range)
Fireworks
Food Safety
Forest and Open Space Preservation
Forest Buffers and Open Space Conservation
GIS Mapping/Inventory/Data
Graffiti
Hazardous Wastes
Home-Based Businesses
Impact Fees
Investment Policies
Junk & Litter Control
Lake Protection and Management
Lobbying
Media
Miscellaneous
Noise
Open Space Preservation
Outdoor Advertising & Signs
Partnership Agreements
Partnerships
Personnel Management
Pest Management
Planning
Public Health and Safety
Public Participation
Recycling
Residency Requirements
Restoration
Roads
Sewage/Sewers
Sexual Harassment
Smoking in Public Places
Solid Waste
Stormwater Management
Sustainability Values
Sustainable Building Practices
Sustainable Development
Telecommunications
Tobacco Sales to Minors
Trespass
Utilities
Wastewater
Water

Water Quality and Source Water Protection
Wetlands
Wetlands, Watersheds, and Drinking Water Protection
Workplace Violence
Zoning and Planning

Today's Word:

Maleficent (*adjective*)

Pronunciation: [mê-'le-fi-sint] Listen

Definition: Evil, intensely spiteful, causing harm to others.



SEE YOU IN FOUR YEARS, BABE

Today's Word:

Expatriate (*Verb*)

Pronunciation: [ek-'spey-shi-yeyt] Listen

Definition 1: To wander freely.

Usage 1: The second meaning is used far more than the first.

Definition 2: To speak or write at length, especially without focus.